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In November 2016 we submitted to arXiv our paper “Au-
tomated Inference on Criminality Using Face Images”. It
generated a great deal of discussions in the Internet and
some media outlets. Our work is only intended for pure aca-
demic discussions; how it has become a media consumption
is a total surprise to us.
Although in agreement with our critics on the need and
importance of policing AI research for the general good of
the society, we are deeply baffled by the ways some of them
mispresented our work, in particular the motive and objec-
tive of our research.
1. Name calling
It should be abundantly clear, for anyone who reads our
paper with a neutral mind setting, that our only motive is to
know if machine learning has the potential of acquiring hu-
manlike social perceptions of faces, despite the complexity
and subtlety of such perceptions that are functions of both
the observed and the observer. Our inquiry is to push the
envelope and extend the research on automated face recog-
nition from the biometric dimension (e.g., determining the
race, gender, age, facial expression, etc.) to the sociopsy-
chological dimension. We are merely interested in the dis-
tinct possibility of teaching machines to pass the Turing test
on the task of duplicating humans in their first impressions
(e.g., personality traits, mannerism, demeanor, etc.) of a
stranger. The face perception of criminality was expedi-
ently (unfortunately to us in hindsight) chosen as an easy
test case, at least in our intuition as explained in our paper:
“For validating the hypothesis on the correla-
tions between the innate traits and social behav-
iors of a person and the physical characteristics
of that persons face, it would be hard pushed to
find a more convincing experiment than examin-
ing the success rates of discriminating between
criminals and non-criminals with modern auto-
matic classifiers. These two populations should
be among the easiest to differentiate, if social
attributes and facial features are correlated, be-
cause being a criminal requires a host of abnor-
mal (outlier) personal traits. If the classifica-
tion rate turns out low, then the validity of face-
induced social inference can be safely negated.”
By a magical stretch of imagination, few of our critics
intertwine the above passage into some of our honest ob-
servations and morph them into the following deduction of,
they insist, ours:
“Those with more curved upper lips and eyes
closer together are of a lower social order, prone
to (as Wu and Zhang put it) “a host of abnormal
(outlier) personal traits” ultimately leading to a
legal diagnosis of “criminality” with high proba-
bility.”
We agree that the pungent word criminality should be
put in quotation marks; a caveat about the possible biases
in the input data should be issued. Taking a court convic-
tion at its face value, i.e., as the “ground truth” for machine
learning, was indeed a serious oversight on our part. How-
ever, throughout our paper we maintain a sober neutrality
on whatever we might find; in the introduction, we declare
“In this paper we intend not to nor are we qual-
ified to discuss or debate on societal stereotypes,
rather we want to satisfy our curiosity in the accu-
racy of fully automated inference on criminality.
At the onset of this study our gut feeling is that
modern tools of machine learning and computer
vision will refute the validity of physiognomy, al-
though the outcomes turn out otherwise.”
Nowhere in our paper advocated the use of our method as
a tool of law enforcement, nor did our discussions advance
from correlation to causality. But still we got interpreted
copiously by some with an insinuation of racism. This is
not the way of academic exchanges we are used to.
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Now we came to regret our choice of the terminology
“physiognomy”, the closest English translation for the Chi-
nese folklore term “Mian Xiang Xue”. We were not sen-
sitive enough to the inherent dirty connotation of the word
in the English speaking academia; merely using the term
deserves the label of “scientific racism”?
2. Base Rate Fallacy
While some of our critics proclaimed “writing for a wide
audience: not only for researchers · · · ”, they conveniently
did not address the clear symptom of “base rate fallacy” ex-
hibited by non-technical types in internet blogs and some
media coverage. Many reports and comments on our re-
search overemphasize on high success rates (granted, still
in need of more rigorous validation) of our classifiers; they
leap from these numbers to the “grave” danger of AI. Sorry,
we have to bore technical readers by pointing out a trap of
invalid reasoning called the base rate fallacy: the mind tends
to lock on a high specific probability (the 89% true positive
rate of our CNN classifier) and ignore the very low under-
lying background probability (0.36% crime rate in China).
If Wu is tested positive by our “criminality” classifier,
how high a chance will he break the law? Nine of ten odds
as cried out by a journalist? By Bayesian statistical infer-
ence (a rudimentary knowledge to research communities)
Wu’s chance of committing a crime is
P (C|+) = P (+|C)P (C)
P (+|C)P (C) + P (+|N)(1− P (C)) (1)
where P (+|C) = 0.89 is the probability that a convicted
Chinese adult male is tested positive by our CNN face clas-
sifier, P (C) = 0.0036 is the crime rate of China, and
P (+|N) = 0.07 is the probability that a non-criminal Chi-
nese adult male is tested positive. Plugging all these num-
bers into the Bayes formula, Wu is found to have a proba-
bility of only 4.39% to break the law, despite being tested
positive by a method of unbelievably high accuracy. Hope-
fully, this mathematical journey from 89% to 4.39% will
put many of our critics at ease. Having done the above ex-
ercise we want to stress again our strong opposition against
any practical uses of our methods, not only because their
accuracies fall far below any minimum standard.
Base rate fallacy is an old trick used by irresponsible me-
dia to sensationalize or exaggerate either the virtue or vice
of new (unfamiliar/mysterious to general public) technolog-
ical and scientific advances. It can be easily manipulated to
instill irrational fears or hopes into ordinary folks about the
AI research.
3. Garbage in
As much irked by the intellectually chauvinistic tone of
few of our critics, we do not dispute their progressive social
values. There is really no need to parade infamous racists
in chronic order with us inserted at the terminal node. But
the objectivity does exist, at least in theory, independent of
whatever prevailing social norms.
With a Ph.D in computer science, we know all too well
“garbage in and garbage out”. However, some of our crit-
ics seemed to suggest that machine learning tools cannot be
used in social computing simply because no one can pre-
vent the garbage of human biases from creeping in. We do
not share their pessimism. Like most technologies, machine
learning is neutral. If it can be used to reinforce human bi-
ases in social computing problems as some argued, then it
can also be used to detect and correct human biases (preju-
dice). They worry about the feedback loop but conveniently
do not see that the feedback can be either positive or nega-
tive. Granted, the criminality is a highly delicate and com-
plex matter; however, well-trained human experts can strive
to ensure the objectivity of the training data, i.e., render-
ing correct legal decisions independent of facial appearance
of the accused. If the labeling of training face images, or
any other type of data for that matter, is free of human bi-
ases, then the advantages of automated inference over hu-
man judgment in objectivity cannot be denied.
Even in the presence of label noises, regardless they are
random or systematic, scientific methods do exist to laun-
der and restore/enhance credence to the results of statistical
inferences. Should we forego scientific knowledge for any
shade of populism?
4. Risk of Overfitting
Our critics are quick to point out the relatively small
sample set used in our experiments and the risk of data over-
fitting. We are sorely aware of this weakness but cannot
get more ID images of convicted Chinese males for obvious
reasons (the sort of ongoing publicity might have dashed all
our hopes to enrich our data set). However, we did make
our best efforts to validate our findings in Section 3.3 of our
paper, which opened as follows but completely ignored by
our critics.
“Given the high social sensitivities and repercus-
sions of our topic and skeptics on physiognomy
[19], we try to excise maximum caution before
publishing our results. In playing devil’s advo-
cate, we design and conduct the following exper-
iments to challenge the validity of the tested clas-
sifiers · · · ”
We randomly label the faces of our training set as neg-
ative and positive instances with equal probability, and run
all four classifiers to test if any of them can separate the
randomly labeled face images with a chance better than flip-
ping a coin. All face classifiers fail the above test and other
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similar, more challenging tests (refer to our paper for de-
tails). These empirical findings suggest that the good clas-
sification performances reported in our paper are not due
to data overfitting; otherwise, given the same size and type
of sample set, the classifiers would also be able to separate
randomly labeled data.
Although our sample set of 2000 face images is far from
being large, it is already one order of magnitude larger than
the one used in a similar study carried out by a team of
Cornell researchers. More importantly, the adequacy of the
sample set size is a function of the variability of the data on
hand. In our case, all face images are of the same race, gen-
der, and the head pose; all facial landmark points are aligned
via an affine transform. All these factors greatly reduce the
data variability and thus the risk of data overfitting.
5. White Collar
Regarding to the question of our critics on the wearing
of white-collared shirts by some men but not by others in
the ID portraits used in our experiments, we did segment
the face portion out of all ID images. The face-only images
are used in training and testing. The complete ID portraits
are presented in our paper only for illustration purposes. We
did not spell out this data preparation detail because it is a
standard practice of the field.
Nevertheless, the cue of white collar exposes an impor-
tant detail that we owe the readers an apology. That is, we
could not control for socioeconomic status of the gentlemen
whose ID photos were used in our experiments. Not be-
cause we did not want to, but we did not have access to the
metadata due to confidentiality issues. Now reflecting on
this nuance, we speculate that the performance of our face
classifiers would drop if the image data were controlled for
socioeconomic status. Immediately a corollary of social in-
justice might follow, we suppose. In fact, this is precisely
why we thought that our results could have significance to
social sciences.
6. Smiley
In our experiments, we did control facial expressions
(e.g., smile and sad) but not faint micro-expressions (e.g.,
relaxed vs. strained). We intend to exert much tighter con-
trol on facial micro-expressions in the future as soon as a
reliable algorithm reaches the sophistication to do so.
The critique that our methods can be reduced to a sim-
ple discriminator of smiling versus not-smiling has given us
a new angle of scrutiny. Some Westerns think, by staring
at the representative faces (“subtypes”) found by our clus-
tering analysis (reproduced as Figure 1) of the two popula-
tions, that the faces in the bottom row have hints of smile
whereas those in the top row do not. But our Chinese stu-
dents and colleagues, even after being prompted to consider
(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g)
Figure 1. (a), (b), (c) and (d) are the four face subtypes correspond-
ing to four cluster centroids on the manifold of Sc; (e), (f) and (g)
are the three subtypes of non-criminal faces corresponding to three
cluster centroids on the manifold of Sn.
the cue of smile, fail to detect the same. Instead, they only
find the faces in the bottom row appearing somewhat more
relaxed than those in the top row. Perhaps, the different per-
ceptions here are due to cultural differences.
All criminal ID photos are government issued, but not
mug shots. To our best knowledge, they are normal gov-
ernment issued ID portraits like those for driver’s license in
USA. In contrast, most of the noncriminal ID style photos
are taken officially by some organizations (such as real es-
tate companies, law firms, etc.) for their websites. We stress
that they are not selfies.
In our paper, we have also taken steps to prevent the ma-
chine learning methods, CNN in particular, from picking up
superficial differences between images, such as compres-
sion noises and different cameras (Section 3.3).
In conclusion, we appreciate all questions and discus-
sions surrounding our paper, but categorically reject the
distortions of our intentions, which are not helpful for the
progress and health of the AI research.
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Abstract
We study, for the first time, automated inference on crim-
inality based solely on still face images, which is free of
any biases of subjective judgments of human observers.
Via supervised machine learning, we build four classifiers
(logistic regression, KNN, SVM, CNN) using facial im-
ages of 1856 real persons controlled for race, gender, age
and facial expressions, nearly half of whom were convicted
criminals, for discriminating between criminals and non-
criminals. All four classifiers perform consistently well and
empirically establish the validity of automated face-induced
inference on criminality, despite the historical controversy
surrounding this line of enquiry. Also, some discriminat-
ing structural features for predicting criminality have been
found by machine learning. Above all, the most important
discovery of this research is that criminal and non-criminal
face images populate two quite distinctive manifolds. The
variation among criminal faces is significantly greater than
that of the non-criminal faces. The two manifolds consist-
ing of criminal and non-criminal faces appear to be con-
centric, with the non-criminal manifold lying in the kernel
with a smaller span, exhibiting a law of ”normality” for
faces of non-criminals. In other words, the faces of gen-
eral law-biding public have a greater degree of resemblance
compared with the faces of criminals, or criminals have
a higher degree of dissimilarity in facial appearance than
non-criminals.
1. Introduction
Motivated by many commercial applications of artificial
intelligence and man-machine interfaces, the research com-
munities of pattern recognition and computer vision have
devoted a great deal of efforts to the recognition and manip-
ulation of human faces [11, 31, 40, 35], and achieved mea-
sured successes. But very little research has been done on
analyzing and quantifying social perception and attributes
of faces [33], although this subject is of great importance
to many academic disciplines, such as social psychology,
management science, criminology, etc.
In all cultures and all periods of recorded human history,
people share the belief that the face alone suffices to re-
veal innate traits of a person. Aristotle in his famous work
Prior Analytics asserted, ”It is possible to infer character
from features, if it is granted that the body and the soul are
changed together by the natural affections”. Psychologists
have known, for as long as a millennium, the human ten-
dency of inferring innate traits and social attributes (e.g., the
trustworthiness, dominance) of a person from his/her facial
appearance, and a robust consensus of individuals’ infer-
ences . These are the facts found through numerous studies
[3, 39, 5, 6, 10, 26, 27, 34, 32].
Independent of the validity of pedestrian belief in the
(pseudo)science of physiognomy, a tantalizing question nat-
urally arises: what facial features influence average Joes’
impulsive and yet consensual judgments on social attributes
of a non-acquaintance member of their own specie? At-
tempting to answer the question, Todorov and Oosterhof
proposed a data-driven statistical modeling method to find
visual determinants of social attributes by asking human
subjects to score four percepts: dominance, attractiveness,
trustworthiness, and extroversion, based on first impression
of static face images [33]. This method can synthesize a
representative (average) face image for a set of input face
images scored closely on any of the four aforementioned
social percepts. The ranking of these synthesized face im-
ages by subjective scores (e.g., from least to most trustwor-
thy looking) apparently agrees with the intuition of most
people.
Following the consensus in social perception from fa-
cial appearance, arrives the next even bigger speculation:
is there any diagnostic merit of the face-induced inferences
on an individual’s social attributes? In this paper we in-
tend not to nor are we qualified to discuss or debate on
societal stereotypes, rather we want to satisfy our curios-
ity in the accuracy of fully automated inference on crim-
inality. At the onset of this study our gut feeling is that
modern tools of machine learning and computer vision will
refute the validity of physiognomy, although the outcomes
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turn out otherwise. Adopting an approach of supervised
machine learning, we build four classifiers (logistic regres-
sion [17], K-nearest neighbor (KNN) [2], Support Vector
Machine (SVM) [14], and Convolutional Neural Networks
(CNN) [21]) using facial images of 1856 real persons, half
of whom were convicted criminals, and evaluate the perfor-
mances of these learnt classifiers. The work presented by
this paper is the first of its kind to our best knowledge.
As modern machine learning algorithms can match and
even exceed human’s performance in face recognition [24],
it becomes irresistible to pursue automated inference on
criminality. Just like in face recognition, first impressions
from faces are raw, spontaneous assessments that are a re-
sult of perceiving rather than reasoning. Even 3-to-4-year-
olds reach a degree of agreement with adults in faced-
induced judgment of social attributes [13]. Therefore, we
believe that social perception of faces should be a wor-
thy and challenging topic for computer vision and machine
learning.
For validating the hypothesis on the correlations between
the innate traits and social behaviors of a person and the
physical characteristics of that person’s face, it would be
hard pushed to find a more convincing experiment than ex-
amining the success rates of discriminating between crim-
inals and non-criminals with modern automatic classifiers.
These two populations should be among the easiest to dif-
ferentiate, if social attributes and facial features are corre-
lated, because being a criminal requires a host of abnormal
(outlier) personal traits. If the classification rate turns out
low, then the validity of face-induced social inference can
be safely negated.
In contrast to a large body of research literature on the
prevalence and consequences of appearance-induced infer-
ence on personal traits in the field of psychology, relatively
little study has been done on the accuracy of character infer-
ence based solely on still face images [37]. This is probably
due to, aside from the historical controversies surrounding
the inquiry and stigmas associated with social Darwinism,
the difficulty to neutralize all possible prejudice and pre-
conditioning of human experimenters and subjects when as-
sessing the accuracy of face-induced inference on socially
charged matters such as criminality. In this work, we adopt
the approach of data-driven machine learning to fully au-
tomate the assessment process, and purposefully take any
subtle human factors out of the assessment process.
Unlike a human examiner/judge, a computer vision al-
gorithm or classifier has absolutely no subjective baggages,
having no emotions, no biases whatsoever due to past expe-
rience, race, religion, political doctrine, gender, age, etc.,
no mental fatigue, no preconditioning of a bad sleep or
meal. The automated inference on criminality eliminates
the variable of meta-accuracy (the competence of the hu-
man judge/examiner) all together. Besides the advantage
of objectivity, sophisticated algorithms based on machine
learning may discover very delicate and elusive nuances in
facial characteristics and structures that correlate to innate
personal traits and yet hide below the cognitive threshold of
most untrained nonexperts. This is at least a distinct theo-
retical possibility.
Although being the first to study automatic face-induced
inference on criminality, our findings are significant in that
they are derived not only by more advanced data analysis al-
gorithms but also from more realistic, higher quality data set
than in previous similar studies carried out by psychologists
who use traditional methods. Our data for the training of the
classifiers are standard ID photographs of real persons con-
trolled for race, gender, age, and facial expression. In con-
trast, other studies used sample face images that were syn-
thetic and generated by either 2D or 3D face models based
on eigenfaces [35, 8, 9]. However, it is not clear that the
synthetic faces, generated by random perturbing parameters
of a mathematical face model as done in [35, 8], truly and
fairly represent the population. Only in Valla et al.’s study
on face-induced inference on criminality, real face images
of male Caucasians were used [37]. But in this study hu-
mans not computers performed the classification task.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we de-
tail the preparations of experiment data and the control of
variables to set the subsequent data-driven machine learn-
ing methods for inferring criminality on solid ground. In
Section 3, we represent our methods for assessing the ac-
curacy of automated face-induced inference on criminality
and report our findings, which offer strong evidences point-
ing to high success rate of automatic classification between
criminals and non-criminals based on ID photos. The pos-
itive results are cross-validated vigorously. In Section 4,
we explore discriminating facial features that contribute to
the success of automated face-induced inference on crim-
inality. In Section 5, we try to gain some insight in the
underlying mechanism for the separability of criminal and
non-criminal faces via cluster analysis on manifolds. It is
found that criminal face images and non-criminal face im-
ages populate two quite distinctive manifolds. The varia-
tion among criminal faces is significantly greater than that
of the non-criminal faces. The two manifolds formed re-
spectively by the two data sets of criminal and non-criminal
faces are concentric, with the manifold for the non-criminal
face images lying in the kernel with a smaller span. This
newly discovered knowledge suggests a law of normality
for faces of non-criminals: Given the race, gender and age,
the faces of general law-biding public have a greater degree
of resemblance compared with the faces of criminals. In
other words, criminals have a significantly higher degree of
dissimilarity in facial appearance than normal population.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2
(a) Three samples in criminal ID photo set Sc.
(b) Three samples in non-criminal ID photo set Sn
Figure 1. Sample ID photos in our data set.
2. Data preparation
In order to conduct our experiments and draw conclu-
sions with strict control of variables, we collected 1856 ID
photos that satisfy the following criteria: Chinese, male,
between ages of 18 and 55, no facial hair, no facial scars
or other markings, and denote this data set by S. Set S is
divided into two subsets Sn and Sc for non-criminals and
criminals, respectively. Subset Sn contains ID photos of
1126 non-criminals that are acquired from Internet using the
web spider tool; they are from a wide gamut of professions
and social status, including waiters, construction workers,
taxi and truck drivers, real estate agents, doctors, lawyers
and professors; roughly half of the individuals in subset Sn
have university degrees.
Subset Sc contains ID photos of 730 criminals, of which
330 are published as wanted suspects by the ministry of
public security of China and by the departments of public
security for the provinces of Guangdong, Jiangsu, Liaoning,
etc.; the others are provided by a city police department in
China under a confidentiality agreement. We stress that the
criminal face images in Sc are normal ID photos not police
mugshots. Out of the 730 criminals 235 committed violent
crimes including murder, rape, assault, kidnap and robbery;
the remaining 536 are convicted of non-violent crimes, such
as theft, fraud, abuse of trust (corruption), forgery and rack-
eteering. Some sample ID photos in Sc and Sn are dis-
played in Figure 1. The individuals in Sc and Sn are resi-
dents of a very large geographical areas, stretching from the
northeast all the way to the far south of China and including
poor and very rich provinces of the country.
In all selected ID photos, only the region of the face and
upper neck is extracted and the background is removed. All
the extracted faces are normalized in size and aligned into
an 80 × 80 image. Although all test face images are ID
photos acquired with uniform frontal lighting, we still take
extra measures to neutralize any possible effects of varied
illumination conditions. Only the luminance component of
all color face images is used to factor out the spectrum of
the lighting and the skin color. Moreover, all resulting grey
scale images are normalized to have the same intensity dis-
tribution or the same overall tone production. This is done
by matching the histogram of every input image to the aver-
age histogram for the entire data set of 1856 grey scale face
images.
All ID photos in S are JPEG compressed with QP factor
of 90 or higher. Still we applied JPEG soft decoding tech-
niques [23, 28] to remove small (perceptually transparent)
compression noises; in the process any device-dependent,
signal-level signatures are destroyed as well.
3. Validity of Face Classifiers on Criminality
As argued in the introduction, one way of assessing the
accuracy of the automated inference on criminality based
solely on still face images is to build and test classifiers with
modern machine learning techniques. This section presents
the design and results of the classification experiments.
3.1. Methods
In order to prove or disprove the hypothesis that still face
images suffice to distinguish criminals and non-criminals,
we try to make our investigations as thorough as possible.
We run four different classification methods, logistic regres-
sion, KNN, SVM and CNN, on the image data set S pre-
pared as above.
As the first three classification methods work on image
features, we run them and evaluate their performances on a
wide range of features, including 1. Facial landmark points
like eye corners, mouth corners and tip of the nose, etc.;
2. Facial feature vector generated by modular PCA [18]; 3.
Facial feature vector based on Local Binary Pattern (LBP)
histograms [1]; 4. The concatenation of the above three fea-
ture vectors. We stress that the landmark points are defined
of strategic positions on a face, hence they are features that
are beyond signal level and invariant to source cameras.
Our convolutional neural network is constructed by re-
training the parameters of every layer in AlexNet [21] while
retaining its architecture.
Define the criminal subset Sc as the positive class and
the non-criminal subset Sn as the negative class. We per-
form 10-fold cross validation for all possible combinations
of the three feature-driven classifiers and the four types of
feature vectors, plus data-driven CNN without explicit fea-
ture vector; altogether thirteen cases (3 classifiers × 4 fea-
ture vectors plus CNN) of 10-fold cross validation type. In
the interest of statistic significance we repeated the cross
validation for each of the thirteen cases ten times with dif-
ferent random seeds. In each of these (13 cases × 10 runs)
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LBP
Combined feature
KNN LR SVM CNN
Figure 2. Accuracy of all four classifiers in all thirteen cases.
Classifiers CNN SVM KNN LR
AUC 0.9540 0.9303 0.8838 0.8666
Table 1. The AUC results for the four tested face classifiers on
criminality.
130 experiments, we examine the rate of correctly classify-
ing a member of S into Sn or Sc, and then average the rates
of each case over ten runs.
3.2. Results
In Figure 2, we plot the accuracies of all four classifiers
in the above thirteen cases. As expected, the state-of-the-art
CNN classifier performs the best, achieving 89.51% accu-
racy. The relatively high accuracy of CNN is also paralleled
by all other three classifiers which are only few percentage
points behind in the success rate of classification. These
highly consistent results are evidences for the validity of au-
tomated face-induced inference on criminality, despite the
historical controversy surrounding the topic. We also plot
the missing rate and false alarm rate for the four tested clas-
sifiers in Figure 3 and Figure 4.
To measure the sensitivities of the automatic, data-
driven, binary face classifiers for criminality in relation to
their false alarm rates, we plot the ROC curves for the four
tested classifiers (see Figure 5), and report the correspond-
ing AUC results in Table 1 as well. By these classification
performance metrics, the prediction power of the proposed
approach of automated face-induced inference on criminal-
ity is established.
3.3. Validation
Given the high social sensitivities and repercussions of
our topic and skeptics on physiognomy [19], we try to ex-
cise maximum caution before publishing our results. In
playing devil’s advocate, we design and conduct the fol-
lowing experiments to challenge the validity of the tested
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Figure 3. Missing rate of all four classifiers in all thirteen cases.
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Figure 4. False alarm rate of all four classifiers in all thirteen cases.
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Figure 5. The ROC curves of the four tested binary face classifiers
on criminality.
classifiers for the task of discriminating between criminals
and non-criminals. We randomly label the faces in the very
same sample set S as negative and positive instances with
equal probability, and redo all the above experiments of bi-
nary classification. The outcomes show that the randomly
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(a)
(b)
Figure 6. Noisy versions (σ = 0.03) of sample ID photos in Figure
1.
generated negative and positive instances cannot be distin-
guished at all; the average classification accuracy is found to
be only 48%, false negative rate about 51% and false posi-
tive rate about 50%. Similar fifty-fifty observations are also
made by randomly and equal-probably labeling the mem-
bers of subset Sc (or Sn) as positive and negative instances,
and checking the performances of the four binary classi-
fiers, after they are built upon and applied to the randomly
shuffled classes.
In fact, we go much further along the self-critical path,
and carry out the same experiments of random labeling on
different sample sets of the same size (1500) and with the
same variable control. Only this time the selection criteria
are: case 1. standard ID photos of Chinese, female, young
or middle age, no facial scars or other markings; case 2.
standard ID photos of Caucasian, male, young or middle
age, no facial markings; case 3. standard ID photos of Cau-
casian, female, young or middle age, no facial markings.
In none of the three cases, any of the four classifiers man-
ages to achieve a true positive rate higher than 53 percent
on randomly labeled positive and negative instances.
The above experiments rule out that the good accuracies
of the four evaluated classifiers in face-induced inference on
criminality are due to data overfitting; otherwise, given the
same sample size, they would also be able to distinguish be-
tween the randomly labeled positive and negative instances
with significantly better chances than guessing at random.
The big jump of the true positive rate from random labeling
to truth labeling of the same set S of sample face images can
only be explained by intrinsic separability of Sc and Sn.
As different source cameras generated the ID photos in
set S, they might leave their signatures that, although below
perception threshold in signal strength, could mislead ma-
chine learning. This issue was already dealt with at the end
of Section 2 and in Section 3.1 (the use of landmark points
noise σ 0 0.01 0.03
Accuracy SVM 88.98% 81.03% 73.11%CNN 89.51% 82.65% 76.88%
Table 2. The accuracies of the CNN and SVM (using combined
features) face classifiers for different noise levels.
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Figure 7. The ROC curves of the CNN face classifier for different
noise levels.
noise σ 0 0.01 0.03
Accuracy
KNN 79.16% 78.03% 76.81%
LR 83.71% 80.19% 77.45%
SVM 82.99% 81.52% 79.31%
False alarm
KNN 14.79% 15.91% 13.97%
LR 10.65% 14.01% 13.39%
SVM 11.57% 14.21% 12.51%
Missing
KNN 31.48% 31.52% 38.53%
LR 26.20% 30.20% 37.41%
SVM 26.58% 28.47% 34.29%
Table 3. The accuracy, false alarm and missing rates of the KNN,
LR and SVM classifiers when they use landmark points as features
and operate on noisy face images.
as features). To make our case even tighter we take extra
steps to make the face classifiers completely immune from
any potential biases of source cameras. We redo the exper-
iments in Section 3.1 after adding Gaussian random noises
of zero mean and variance σ2 to the ID photos in S. The
added noises will overpower any camera-dependent signa-
tures. The performances of the classifiers on noisy input
face images are reported in Tables 2 and 3, and Figure 7.
Table 2 shows that the accuracies of the CNN and SVM
(using combined features) face classifiers decrease as noise
level σ increases, but they are still above 73% for SVM
and 76% for CNN even when the noises become visible
(σ = 0.03, see Figure 6). The ROC curves of the CNN face
classifier for different σ are plotted in Figure 7. As shown,
the CNN classifier can withstand severe noise corruption
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and still discriminate between criminals and non-criminals
with high true positive rate and relatively low false positive
rate.
As argued in Section 3.1, landmark points are features
that are invariant to source cameras. Table 3 tabulates the
accuracy, false alarm and missing rates of the KNN, LR and
SVM classifiers when they use landmark points as features
and operate on noisy face images. As we expected, there
are no material changes in all performance numbers over
different noise levels.
Also, we have tested whether the classification results
are robust against slight variations in lighting environment
and face orientation. We recruit 10 male Chinese students
and casually take four face photographs for each of them
in different environments and feed these photos to the four
classifiers built on Sc and Sn. The classification results turn
out to be consistent with a probability higher than 83 per
cent.
4. Discriminating Features
Having obtained the above strong empirical evidences
for the validity of automated face-induced inference on
criminality, one cannot resist the following intriguing ques-
tion: what features of a human face betray its owner’s
propensity for crimes? In fact, the same question has capti-
vated professionals (e.g., psychologists, sociologists, crim-
inologists) and amateurs alike, cross all cultures, and for as
long as there are notions of law and crime. Intuitive specu-
lations are abundant both in writing [16, 12] and folklore. In
this section, we try to answer the question in the most me-
chanical and scientific way allowed by the available tools
and data. The approach is to let a machine learning method
explore the data and reveal the most discriminating facial
features that tell apart criminals and non-criminals. We ap-
ply the Feature Generating Machine (FGM) of Tan et al.
[29] to the task; it identifies the red-marked regions in Fig-
ure 8 (a) as the most critical parts for the separation of crim-
inals and non-criminals. Guided by FGM, we discover that
the following three structural measurements in the critical
areas around eye corners, mouth and philtrum that have sig-
nificantly different distributions for the two populations in
Sc and Sn: the curvature of upper lip denoted by ρ; the
distance between two eye inner corners denoted by d; and
the angle enclosed by rays from the nose tip to the two cor-
ners of the mouth denoted by θ. The three discriminating
structural features ρ, d and θ are shown in Figure 8 (b). We
stress that the upper lip curvature ρ is measured on standard
ID photos taken with the person in neutral facial expression.
Let random variables xc and xn be any of the above three
measurements for criminals and non-criminals. We exam-
ine the two histograms P (xc) and P (xn) and find they have
rather large Hellinger distance [7]. The Hellinger distance
(a)
θ 
d
ρ 
(b)
Figure 8. (a) FGM results; (b) Three discriminative features ρ, d
and θ.
Mean Variance
criminal non-criminal criminal non-criminal
ρ 0.5809 0.4855 0.0245 0.0187
d 0.3887 0.4118 0.0202 0.0144
θ 0.2955 0.3860 0.0185 0.0130
Table 4. The mean and variance for three normalized discrimina-
tive features ρ, d and θ.
between two probability distributions is defined as
H(P (xc), P (xn)) =
√
1−
∑
i
√
P (xc(i)) · P (xn(i))
(1)
Hellinger distance H(·, ·) ranges from 0 to 1, where 0
means that two probability distributions are identical and
1 means that probability distributions are different com-
pletely. In our case, the Hellinger distances are quite sig-
nificant, being 0.3208, 0.2971, 0.3855 for ρ, d and θ, re-
spectively.
In Figure 9, we plot the histograms of ρ, d and θ after
normalizing every measurement to range [0, 1]. The mean
and variance of ρ, d and θ for criminals and non-criminals
are tabulated in Table 4. One can see in Figure 9 and Table
4 that the angle θ from nose tip to two mouth corners is on
average 19.6% smaller for criminals than for non-criminals
and has a larger variance. Also, the upper lip curvature
ρ is on average 23.4% larger for criminals than for non-
criminals. On the other hand, the distance d between two
eye inner corners for criminals is slightly narrower (5.6%)
than for non-criminals. Interestingly, in a study on per-
ceived and measured intelligence by Chvatalova et al. [20],
it was found that greater interpupillary distance is correlated
with higher IQ for Caucasian men. But it is worth noting
that the distance between two eye inner corners is a more
discriminating feature than the interpupillary distance for
the classification of criminals.
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Figure 9. Histograms of the three discriminative features.
5. Face Clustering on Manifolds
Encouraged by the newly found success of machine
learning in face-induced inference on criminality and the
knowledge of the underlying discriminative features, the
next question is logically, what are the typical (average)
faces for criminals and non-criminals? Indeed, some re-
searchers embarked on this type of enquiry and published
on topics such as the characteristic face of female beauty
[25], distinctive faces of certain races [22] and nationali-
ties (e.g., Japanese vs. Koreans vs. Chinese) [38]. Previous
authors attempted to find a typical face (i.e., an average of
some sort) for a category of people, such as Chinese, beau-
tiful female, criminals, and the alike. But in this section,
we argue against the practice of using a single representa-
tive face for a social label such as beauty and criminal, even
when the labeling is highly consensual.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 10. (a) and (b) are ”average” faces for criminals and non-
criminals generated by averaging of eigenface representations ; (c)
and (d) are ”average” faces for criminals and non-criminals gener-
ated by averaging of landmark points and image warping.
Although the antithesis of criminals and non-criminals
is very strong, conventionally-defined average faces of the
two populations Sc and Sn appear hardly distinguishable as
demonstrated in Figure 10. The displayed average faces are
generated either by averaging of landmark points and im-
age warping [15], or by averaging eigenface representations
[36] over the sample set. In order to understand and solve
the puzzle of failing to find an average face of criminals
that is sufficiently distinctive from that of non-criminals, we
look into the high-dimensional distributions of Sc and Sn,
and the structural statistical relationships between the two
populations in Sc and Sn.
The seeming paradox that Sc and Sn can be classified but
the average faces of Sc and Sn appear almost the same can
be explained, if the data distributions of Sc and Sn are heav-
ily mingled and yet separable by a complex surface discrim-
inant. This thought leads to the suspicion: perhaps, mani-
folds are good representations for the data clouds of Sc and
Sn; in other words, faces of criminals and non-criminals are
assumed to populate two quite distinctive manifolds. Our
manifold hypothesis is also promoted by observing that the
differences between faces can be modeled as the results of
continuous morphing.
To test this hypothesis, we compute the cross-class av-
erage manifold distance D× between two subsets Sc and
Sn, and the in-class average manifold distances Dc and Dn
for Sc and Sn, and compare them. Let d(fi, fj) denote
the geodesic distance between two different faces fi and
fj , which is defined as the length of shortest the path be-
tween fi and fj in the sparse neighborhood graph [30]. The
7
aforementioned average manifold distances are defined as
D× =
1
|Sc||Sn|
∑
fi∈Sc,fj∈Sn
d(fi, fj)
Dc =
2
|Sc||Sc − 1|
∑
fi,fj∈Sc;i 6=j
d(fi, fj)
Dn =
2
|Sn||Sn − 1|
∑
fi,fj∈Sn;i6=j
d(fi, fj)
(2)
The sample sets of the criminal and non-criminal face
images reveal that Dc > D× > Dn. These inequalities
of manifold distances and the fact that Sc and Sn have al-
most the same sample mean vectors suggest the possibility
that the two manifolds of Sc and Sn are concentric, with
the non-criminal manifold lying in the kernel with a smaller
span and the criminal manifold forming an outer layer of
large spread.
To verify our intuition, let us visualize the sample distri-
butions of Sc and Sn after a dimensionality reduction pro-
cessing. We adopt the nonlinear dimensionality reduction
method called Isomap [30] to compute a quasi-isometric,
low-dimensional embedding of our ultra-high-dimensional
data sets. Isomap uses the geodesic distance d(a, b) be-
tween two points a and b on a manifold, which is defined to
be the sum of edge weights along the shortest path connect-
ing a and b in the sparse neighborhood graph. The largest
n eigenvectors of the geodesic distance matrix represent the
coordinates in the new n-dimensional Euclidean space.
Figure 11 depicts the relationship of residual variance
and Isomap dimensionality; it indicates that the original
ultra-high dimensional data set can be represented reason-
ably well in a subspace of four to six dimensions. The data
clouds of criminals and non-criminals can be visualized in
Figure 12, in which the first four most significant dimen-
sions of the Isomap are represented by the x, y, z axis, and
the color temperature.
All above analyses and visualization indicate that a sub-
jectively meaningful typical face of criminals, even after
controlled for race, gender, nationality and age, simply does
not exist. Instead, there should be few mutually distinc-
tive subtypes of criminal faces. In other words, the cor-
rect answers lie in data clustering on manifolds. We use the
geodesic K-means clustering [4] to discover these represen-
tative subtypes in sample sets Sc and Sn. In the geodesic
K-means clustering of Sc, first K faces are randomly cho-
sen as tentative centroids on the manifold of Sc, denoted
by gk, 1 ≤ k ≤ K. Then each face fi ∈ Sc is assigned to
cluster Cj whose centroid is the closest to fi in the geodesic
distance d,
j = argmin
1≤k≤K
d(fi, gk). (3)
Next the cluster centroids are updated by the nearest neigh-
Isomap dimensionality
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Figure 11. The relationship of residual variance and Isomap di-
mensionality.
bor rule:
gk = argmin
fi∈Ck
∑
fj∈Ck
d(fi, fj). (4)
The above steps iterate till the cluster centroids converge.
For final cluster Ck, 1 ≤ k ≤ K, we compute the represen-
tative face of subtype k of criminals, by warping all faces
fi ∈ Ck so that the landmark points of fi are aligned with
corresponding ones of gk, and averaging all warped faces.
The same clustering and averaging processes are also
carried out on Sn to produce subtype faces for non-
criminals.
Figure 13 displays four subtypes of criminal faces in
Sc and three subtypes of non-criminal faces in Sn that
are synthesized by the above described processes. These
computer-generated representative faces for criminals and
non-criminals appear to be in agreement with the intuition
of 50 Chinese students of both sexes who participated in an
subjective test. In this experiment, every participant has to
make a binary decision on each of these seven synthesized
subtype faces (presented in random order) and assign score
−1 for being more criminal like, or +1 otherwise. All par-
ticipants do not know that these faces are synthesized nor
how many of them are representatives of criminals. The av-
erage scores for these synthesized faces corresponding clus-
ter centroids are shown in Figure 13.
As the K-means clustering is unsupervised, we need to
justify why there are four subtypes of criminal faces in Sc
but only three subtypes of non-criminal faces in Sn. Figure
14 depicts how the variation within a cluster decreases in
the number of clusters K for both Sc and Sn. The figure
clearly illustrates that there are four well separable clusters
(distinctive facial appearances) for criminal faces as the in-
cluster variation drops quickly till K = 4, while the faces
of non-criminals do not form as many separable clusters in
geodesic distance on the manifold of Sn.
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Figure 12. Data clouds (”+” labels criminals and ”o” labels non-
criminals) in the first four most significant dimensions of the
Isomap, viewed in three different perspectives.
(a) -0.98 (b) -0.68 (c) -0.28 (d) -0.38
(e) 0.76 (f) 0.98 (g) 0.66
Figure 13. (a), (b), (c) and (d) are the four subtypes of criminal
faces corresponding to four cluster centroids on the manifold of
Sc; (e), (f) and (g) are the three subtypes of non-criminal faces
corresponding to three cluster centroids on the manifold of Sn.
The number associated with each face is the average score of hu-
man judges (-1 for criminals; 1 for non-criminals).
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Figure 14. The relationship of variation within a cluster and num-
ber of clusters for criminal and non-criminal data set.
The above data analysis and visualization allow us to
make the following interesting and meaningful conclusion,
which holds at least for the class of human subjects be-
ing examined here, i.e., male Chinese of young or mid-
dle age. Although criminals are a small minority in total
population, they have appreciably greater variations in fa-
cial appearance than general public. This coincides with
the fact that all law-biding citizens share many common so-
cial attributes, whereas criminals tend to have very different
characteristics and circumstances, some of which are quite
unique of the individual’s own.
6. Conclusions
We are the first to study automated face-induced infer-
ence on criminality free of any biases of subjective judg-
ments of human observers. By extensive experiments and
vigorous cross validations, we have demonstrated that via
9
supervised machine learning, data-driven face classifiers are
able to make reliable inference on criminality. Furthermore,
we have discovered that a law of normality for faces of non-
criminals. After controlled for race, gender and age, the
general law-biding public have facial appearances that vary
in a significantly lesser degree than criminals.
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